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1 Introduction
In their classic contribution, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) prove that if preferences are
weakly separable in leisure and other goods, an optimal nonlinear labor income tax is
su¢ cient to implement any incentive compatible Pareto-e¢ cient allocation. The reason
is that, under separability, commodity taxes have no bite on the self-selection constraints
faced by the government in the design of the nonlinear income tax. Treating current
and future consumption as two di¤erent commodities, a corollary of the Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) result is that, under separability, there should be no taxes on interest
income.
In this paper, we argue that this result is due to the strategy of ignoring the role of
nancial system and money holdings in taxation models. This is quite understandable as
accounting for nancial institutions and money introduces many complications into the
picture that are often best ignored. Including them often leads the researcher astray by
having to address issues that are not pertinent to the main question at hand. However,
when it comes to taxation of savings, this strategy can be quite misleading. It implies
that all individual types, high- and low-productivity (rich and poor) earn the same rate
of return on their savings. Yet, there is ample empirical evidence that lower income
consumers tend to carry a higher percentage of their income in cash (which, ignoring
ination, bear no rate of return).1 An immediate implication of this observation is that
even with a unique rate of interest on real savings, the rate of return on total savings
(that include cash) will not be the same for the poor and the rich. Indeed, the rate
will be higher for the rich. Now given that earnings and earning abilities are positively
correlated, one can only conclude that high-productivity persons are somehow able to
earn a higher rate of return on their savings. This can be inferred from the recent work of
Williamson (2008) who, in a monetary model, makes a distinction between connected
1See, e.g., Albanesi (2007).
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and unconnectedagents in terms of their access to nancial institutions.2 He argues
that di¤erent agents may have to carry di¤erent levels of cash balances because of
their sophistication and/or their di¤erent levels of access to other nancial instruments.
One would naturally expect that sophistication be positively correlated with earning
abilities, and access to other nancial instruments with ones actual income (as well as
sophistication). Indeed, given that higher earning abilities are translated into higher
earnings, it is no wonder why low-income groups carry a higher percentage of their
income in cash (as compared to high-income groups). The upshot is that, as a rule, the
more productive and the richer an individual, the higher would be the rate of return
that he can secure on his savings.
We will show that incorporating these more realistic assumptions makes capital
income taxation a useful policy tool even if individual preferences are separable between
leisure and other goods. Of course, there are other reasons why, despite separability in
preferences, one might still want to tax capital income (as recently surveyed by Stiglitz,
2015, pp. 245246).3 Yet the mechanism that we highlight in this paper is a di¤erent
one as it simply incorporates a higher degree of realism into our modeling.
2 The model
Consider a two-period model wherein individuals work in the rst period and consume
in both. The economy is populated with two groups of agents who di¤er in labor
2His aim in doing so is to show that this source of heterogeneity causes monetary policy to have
signicant redistributive implications which, in turn, often leads to a negation of the Friedman rule.
3For example, to restore the desirability of capital income taxes, Saez (2002) assumes that, besides
di¤ering in labor market productivities, individuals also di¤er in tastes, while Cremer et al. (2003)
assume that they di¤er in inherited wealth; Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) assume that relative wage
rates are sensitive to savings via their e¤ect on capital accumulation; Christiansen and Tuomala (2008)
introduce the possibility of income shifting by assuming that labor income can be camouaged as capital
income for tax purposes; Aronsson et al. (2009) relax the assumption that the labor market is perfectly
competitive. Finally, Piketty and Saez (2012) and Bastani et al. (2013) highlight the desirability of
taxing capital income in models where agents face uninsurable uncertainty about, respectively, future
returns and future labor market productivities.
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productivity: some are high-skilled, and are paid a wage rate wh, and some are low-
skilled, and are paid a wage rate w`, with w` < wh. Production takes place through a
linear technology with di¤erent types of labor as inputs. Total population is normalized
to unity and the fraction of agents of type j is denoted by j (with j = `; h). Agents
preferences are separable between leisure and other goods and are represented by the
concave utility function:
U = u (c1; c2) + v (l) ; (1)
where l denotes leisure, c1 consumption in the rst period and c2 consumption in the
second period. All goods (including leisure) are assumed to be normal and the utility
function is strictly increasing in each argument.
Agents can transfer resources across the two periods at an interest rate denoted by
rj , j = `; h. That the interest rate di¤ers for di¤erent types reects Williamsons (2008)
notion of connectedness as discussed in the Introduction. Specically, this notion can be
captured through di¤erences in productivities and incomes. Higher productivity goes
hand in hand with a higher inherent degree of sophistication on the part of the indi-
vidual. The more sophisticated an individual, the higher his knowledge of the nancial
sector and his ability to take advantage of nancial institutions. At the same time, the
more income an individual earns, the more connections he makes (higher incomes
open more doors). This make rj a function of income as well. Both of these factors
appear to underlie Williamsons concept of nancial connectedness allowing richer in-
dividuals to earn a higher rate of return on their savings. Denoting gross labor income
by I, this means that:
rj = rj (I) ; (2)
where @rj (I) =@I  0 and rh (I) > r` (I) ;8I.
The government uses labor- and interest-income taxation to redistribute among
agents. Neither an agents skill type (i.e. his wage rate w) nor his labor supply, denoted
by L, are publicly observable. Labor income I (= wL) is instead publicly observable.
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Thus, while rst-best type-specic lump-sum taxes/transfers are unfeasible, labor in-
come can be taxed via a nonlinear income tax function T (I). Regarding interest income
taxation, we assume that savings transactions can only be observed anonymously, not at
an individual level:4 one can observe the amount in a savings account, but one can not
know whether the savings are done by the o¢ cial holder of the account or by someone
else (like a close friend or a relative).5 This means that interest income can only be
taxed/subsidized at a proportional rate.
To characterize the (constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient allocations, one has to account
for the economys resource balance, the standard self-selection constraints due to our
informational structure, and the implementability constraints caused by the linearity of
the interest income tax itself due to informational constraint. To this end, we derive an
optimal revelation mechanism. This will consist of a set of type-specic before-tax labor
incomes, Ijs (with j = `; h), after-tax incomes, Bjs (with j = `; h), and a proportional
interest income tax rate,  .6
To proceed further, it is necessary to consider the optimization problem of an individ-
ual for a given mechanism ( ;B; I). This is necessitated by the fact that the mechanism
determines personal consumption levels only indirectly, namely through prices. The
mechanism assigns the triple
 
 ;Bj ; Ij

to a young individual who reports his type as
j. The individual will then allocate Bj between rst- and second period consumption.
Denote by the total time endowment of each individual. Given any vector ( ;B; I),
4The same observational assumption is made in Boadway et al. (2000), Cremer et al. (2003),
Blomquist and Micheletto (2008), Bastani et al. (2013), and Gahvari and Micheletto (2014).
5 If one tried to tax savings by a nonlinear function, the incentives for a person with a high marginal
tax on savings to ask a friend, with a lower marginal tax, to do the savings for him would be large.
Our assumption here parallels the assumption usually made about purchases of commodities. The
anonymous transactions can be observed and taxed by a proportional tax, but the personal consumption
levels are not publicly observable.
6This procedure determines  from the outset; a complete solution to the optimal tax problem per
se, i.e. determination of Ij by the individuals via utility maximization, then requires only the design of
a general income tax function T (I) such that Bj = Ij   T  Ij.
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an individual of type j chooses c1 and c2 to maximize
U = u (c1; c2) + v

  I
wj

; j = `; h; (3)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
c1 +
1
1 + (1  )rj (I)c2 = B: (4)
Substituting (4) into (3), the rst-order condition of the problem above is:
@u=@c2
@u=@c1
=
1
1 + (1  )rj (I) : (5)
For a given bundle (I;B), condition (5), and the individuals intertemporal budget
constraint (4), yield the conditional demands for the j-types rst- and second-period
consumption, cj1 and c
j
2. Substituting these conditional demands into (3) provides
the conditional indirect utility of a j-type agent for a given (I;B)-bundle. Denoting
this conditional utility by V
 
 ;B; I;wj

, and using V j ( ;B; I) as a shorthand for
V
 
 ;B; I;wj

, the governments problem can then be represented as,
max
 ;I`;B`;Ih;Bh
X
j=`;h
jV j
 
 ;Bj ; Ij

subject to:
V h

 ;Bh; Ih

 V h

 ;B`; I`

; ()X
j=`;h
j

Ij  Bj + rj  Ij sj  R; ()
where js are positive social welfare weights (with the normalization
P
j=`;h 
j = 1),
Lagrange multipliers are within parentheses, sj  Bj cj1 denotes the savings of a j-type
agent, and R is an exogenous revenue requirement.
The -constraint is the self-selection constraint requiring that a high-skilled agent is
(weakly) better o¤ by choosing the (I;B)-bundle intended for him by the government
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rather than behaving as a mimicker and choosing the bundle (I`; B`) intended for
low-skilled agents.7 The -constraint is the governments budget constraint.
Denote the indirect utility of a high-skilled agent mimicking a low-skilled agent by
V h`  V h   ;B`; I`, and denote by @esj=@ the compensated change in savings for a
type-j agent following a marginal increase in  : @esj=@  @sj=@+rjsj  @sj=@Bj < 0.
Proposition 1 states our main result.
Proposition 1 In the presence of an optimal nonlinear labor income tax, and despite
the separability of preferences in labor supply and goods, a capital income tax is a useful
policy tool. Its optimal value is given by
 =

 
r`s`   rh`sh`  @V h`=@B`

P
j=`;h 
jrj (@esj=@) > 0: (6)
Proof. We derive eq. (6) in the Appendix. To prove that  > 0, rst observe
that, since the denominator of the right hand side of (6) is negative, interest income
ought to be taxed (subsidized) when r`s` < (>) rh`sh`. Given our assumption that, 8I,
rh (I) > r` (I), and given that a high-skilled mimicker earns the same labor income as a
low-skilled agent, we can conclude that rh` > r`. Thus, if sh`  s`, one immediately gets
rh`sh` > r`s`. But the same result is obtained also if sh` < s`. This is due to the fact
that rh` > r` =) ch`2 > c`2;8 with c2 = [1 + r (1  )] s, the last inequality implies that
1 + rh` (1  ) sh` > 1 + r` (1  ) s` or, rearranging, that (1  )  rh`sh`   r`s` >
s`   sh` > 0.
Intuitively, despite separability in preferences, a high-skilled mimicker and a low-
skilled agent end up earning di¤erent rates of return on their savings and will have
di¤erent (intertemporal) consumption proles. Interest income taxation can then be
7Restricting attention to the so called normalcase when the direction of redistribution goes from
the high-skilled to the low-skilled agents, we can safely disregard the self-selection constraint requiring
low-skilled agents not to mimic high-skilled agents.
8A high skilled behaving as a mimicker and a low-skilled agent both choose the bundle (I`; B`)
intended by the government only for the latter. For a given value of B`, a higher r implies substitution
and income e¤ects that both push towards increasing second-period consumption.
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used as an instrument to relax the binding self-selection constraint faced by the govern-
ment in the design of the nonlinear income tax.
Before concluding, three remarks are in order.
First, allowing for individual preferences that are non-separable between leisure and
other goods might change the result that it is optimal to tax interest income only if
leisure and second-period consumption are su¢ ciently strong substitutes.9
Second, notice that the fact that r has been assumed to also be a function of I
(see (2)) has really no bite for our result. What drives the result that  > 0 is the
assumption that, 8I, rh (I) > r` (I), capturing the idea that agents di¤er in terms of
nancial sophistication.
Finally, notice that the same qualitative result, viz. the fact that  > 0, would be
obtained in a setting where r can be a¤ected by the time-e¤ort exerted by the saver
searching for better investment opportunities. Consider for instance the case where,
denoting by e the time devoted by agents searching for more protable investment
opportunities, r is dened as r  r (e), with r0 > 0 and r00 < 0, and individual preferences
are represented by U = u (c1; c2) + v
 
  I
wj
  e. Even when the r () function is the
same for all agents, it is straightforward to show that, with a high-skilled mimicker and a
low-skilled agent choosing the same (I`; B`)-bundle, the former nds it optimal to spend
more time than the latter searching for better investment opportunities, i.e. eh` > e`.10
9Complementarity between leisure and second-period consumption would strengthen the argument
for using interest income taxation as a mimicking-deterring device. This is due to the fact that, since
a high-skilled mimicker, being more productive than a low-skilled agent, works less than a low-skilled
agent, complementarity between leisure and second-period consumption implies that a mimicker would
like to consume more in the second period (and therefore save more) than a low-skilled. This introduces
a second mechanism, acting on top of the one due to the di¤erence in nancial sophistication, that works
in the direction of making the di¤erence r`s`   rh`sh` negative. If instead leisure and second-period
consumption were substitutes, the sign of the optimal interest income tax would be a priori ambiguous.
When leisure and second-period consumption are substitutes, a mimicker would like to consume less in
the second period (and therefore save less) than a low-skilled. In this case the sign of r`s`   rh`sh` is
ambiguous. On one hand, the di¤erence in nancial sophistication tends to make it negative; on the
other hand, the fact that leisure and second-period consumption are substitutes works in the opposite
direction.
10 Intuitively, this is due to the fact that a high-skilled mimicker has more time available, net of
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With @r=@e > 0, this in turn would imply rh` > r`, and one could then proceed, as done
in the proof of Proposition 1, to prove that r`s`  rh`sh` < 0. E¤ectively, assuming that
r = r (e) (with r0 > 0 and r00 < 0) allows to endogenously derive a di¤erence in nancial
sophistication based on a model where the only dimension of (exogenous) heterogeneity
is labor productivity.
3 Concluding remarks
This paper has developed a simple model to show that the widely-held belief that the
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem proves capital incomes should not be taxed is
unwarranted. It has argued that this result is in fact due to the strategy of ignoring the
role of nancial system and money holdings in taxation models. Incorporating these
realistic features makes capital income taxation a useful policy tool even if individual
preferences are separable between leisure and other goods. The underlying reason is that
in an economy with nancial institutions and money holdings, the more productive and
richer individuals are also able to secure a higher rate of return on their savings than
the less productive and poorer individuals. Consequently, interest income taxation relax
the binding self-selection constraint the government faces in the design of the optimal
nonlinear labor income tax.
working hours I=w, than a low-skilled agent.
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Appendix
Derivation of eq. (6): The rst-order conditions to the governments problem are:
h + 
 @V h
@Ih
+ h
(
1 + 

sh + rh
@sh
@rh

@rh
 
Ih

@Ih
)
= 0; (A1)
`
@V `
@I`
  @V
h`
@I`
+ `
(
1 + 

s` + r`
@s`
@r`

@r`
 
I`

@I`
)
= 0; (A2)

h + 
 @V h
@Bh
+

 1 + rh @s
h
@Bh

h = 0; (A3)
`
@V `
@B`
  @V
h`
@B`
+

 1 + r` @s
`
@B`

` = 0; (A4)
h + 
 @V h
@
+ `
@V `
@
  @V
h`
@
+ 
X
j=`;h
j

rjsj + rj
@sj
@

= 0: (A5)
Using Roys identity, we can rewrite eq. (A5) as,
 

h + 

rhsh
@V h
@Bh
  `r`s`@V
`
@B`
+ rh`sh`
@V h`
@B`
+ 
X
j=`;h
j

rjsj + rj
@sj
@

= 0:
(A6)
Multiplying eq. (A3) by rhsh
 
@V h=@Bh

and eq. (A4) by r`s`
 
@V `=@B`

, and adding
up the resulting equations to eq. (A6) gives,
h + 

rhsh
@V h
@Bh
+ `r`s`
@V `
@B`
  @V
h`
@B`
r`s`
+

 1 + rh @s
h
@Bh

hrhsh +

 1 + r` @s
`
@B`

`r`s`
+ 
X
j=`;h
j

rjsj + rj
@sj
@

+ rh`sh`
@V h`
@B`
 

h + 

rhsh
@V h
@Bh
  `r`s`@V
`
@B`
= 0:
Simplifying and collecting terms yields,

24X
j=`;h
 
rj
2
j
@sj
@Bj
sj +
X
j=`;h
jrj
@sj
@
35+ @V h`
@B`

rh`sh`   r`s`

= 0: (A7)
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Using a tildesymbol to denote a compensated variable and exploiting a Slutsky-type
decomposition to write @sj=@ = @esj=@   rjsj  @sj=@Bj, we can nally rewrite eq.
(A7) as,

0@X
j=`;h
jrj
@esj
@
1A+ @V h`
@B`

rh`sh`   r`s`

= 0:
Rearranging terms yields eq. (6).
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